POLITICAL CARTOONS

SUEZ: THE FORGOTTEN WAR AS SEEN BY BRITISH,
EGYTIAN AND ISRAELI CARTOONISTS

Elvis Presley had just recorded Hound Dog; in May Manchester City beat Birmingham City in a legendary FA Cup Final that left goalie Bert Trautmann with a broken neck; France recognised Tunisian independence; later in June Polish workers were reeling after a failed uprising in Pozman. Third class travel was abolished on British railways; £1 was worth $2.80.

On July 19 1956 news broke that heralded trouble; Colonel Nasser of Egypt, meeting the Yugoslav leader Tito and Nehru of India, was stunned to hear that the US – concerned about his pro-Communist leanings – was suddenly withdrawing funding for the Aswan Dam, a giant project to provide water for the Nile Valley and electricity for industry. A world Bank contribution had been contingent on cash from Washington and London, and therefore lapsed.

"- so nobody gives a dam", (Fig 1) was the punning caption on a David Low cartoon published a few days later. It was a subject the doyen of British cartoonists would return to all too often as the Suez Crisis unfolded over the coming months – and marked Britain and the world for ever.

People were used to Middle Eastern dramas, though these were sideshows in the great Cold War confrontation. In recent years there had been attacks on the thousand of British troops occupying the canal zone. (Whitehall used the term "policing", though scores of Egyptians had been killed in just one incident.) The last contingent was withdrawn that June.

Nasser was already a familiar figure, preaching Arab unity and dignity under his and Egypt’s leadership, denouncing the imperialists and the Zionists who had conquered Palastine in 1948. handsome and eloquent, the young officer who helped overthrow the corpulent King Farouk in 1952 had played a staring role at Bandung, the conference of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement, and went on to found the Non-Aligned Movement. His recognition of Communist China - "Red China" as the Americans called it – was one reason why the Aswan offer was withdrawn.

Egyptian tensions with Israel, then just a few years old, were familiar too: in February 1955 the Jewish state retaliated for repeated cross-border guerrilla raids, many by Palestinians, with a massive attack on the Gaze Strip. Egypt counted 51 dead, the Israelis eight. That September Nasser announced a huge deal securing tanks, guns and fighters from communist Czechoslovakia and mortgaged Egypt’s entire cotton crop to pay for it. David Ben-Gurion, the Israeli prime minister, began to prepare for war on his terms.

Nasser was a hero to millions of Arabs from Algiers to Aden, but – like Muamar Gadafy and Saddam Hussein in later years – he was widely portrayed as a bogeyman in the west, despite his flirtation with the US until the Aswan rebuff, and even some exploratory secret contacts with Israel.

The Egyptian leader proved terrific copy for the cartoonists of the day – posturing as he challenged the stocky figure of Ben-Gurion with his wild hair and battledress, provoking the pin-striped, patrician-looking British conservative prime minister, Anthony Eden. Egyptian motifs such as camels, mummies, the Sphinx and the pyramids made for usefully humorous props.

Many Brits, especially ex-servicemen, knew Egypt from the second world war and long before – the “bints”, “shuftis” and “khazis” of popular slang vivid reminders of a link that went back 80 years. Ironically, Britain had at first opposed Ferdinand de Lesseps’ feat of engineering for fear it would only help the French. But in 1875 Disraeli spent £4m to acquire a 44% stake in the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal – securing for the Empire a strategically vital 5,000 mile shortcut in the sea route to India and the Far East.

There had long been concern that Nasser might one day target the canal. And Eden had developed an obsession with him. It got worse in March 1956, when Jordan’s young King Hussein, fearing nationalist unrest encouraged by Egypt, suddenly sacked the veteran British General Sir John Glubb “Pasha” – commander of the Arab Legion. Privately the prime minister told a colleague he wanted Nasser “destroyed”. MI6 tried to oblige.

But the shock was real enough when on July 26 Nasser gave his answer to the “betrayal” over Aswan: Egypt was nationalising the canal company and freezing its assets. It would use its revenues to finance the dam. The imperialists, he boasted in a speech to huge crowds in Alexandria, could “choke in their rage”. Aneurin Bevan, the Labour politician, described later how this looked at the time, even to those who ended up opposing war; “If the sending of one’s police and soldiers into the darkness of the night to seize somebody else’s property is nationalisation, Ali Baba used the wrong terminology.”

Legally, however, Nasser was perfectly within his rights: the canal itself had always been Egyptian territory. Nationalisation meant buying out the French and British shareholders in the company, whose 99-year operating lease had in any case been due to expire in 1968. He also guaranteed freedom of passage – though not to Israeli ships, or to foreign ships bound for Israel.

That cut little ice with Eden. In London that evening the prime minister was hosting a white-tie and tails dinner in Downing Street for King Feisal of Iraq, keystone of the British-backed Baghdad Pact, and a barrier to Soviet penetration of the Middle East. Iraq’s Prime Minister, Nuri Said, the most pro-western of Arab leaders, had some blunt advice: “We should hit Nasser hard and quickly,” he counselled. A dictator such as Nasser could not be allowed to “have his thumb on our windpipe”, Eden insisted.

Newspapers were soon screaming about parallels with Hitler and Mussolini, the annexation of the Rhineland and the seizure of the canal – echoing the disastrous policy of appeasement of the 1930s (opposed by Eden) that ignored or downplayed Nazi and fascist intentions. Nasser’s “Philosophy of the Revolution” had already been compared to Mein Kampf. Low’s “The Colossus of Suez” (below) gave a cooler interpretation of this mood, with a picture of a giant Nasser astride the narrow canal.

The Collossus of Suez
David Low, July 31 1956, Manchester Guardian
Nasser retaliated against Britain and America’s refusal to fund the Aswan Dam
project by nationalising the Suez Canal

But from the start this was far more than an obscure foreign policy issue; the cartoonist quickly addressed concerns that the crisis could mean the return of conscription. And there were soon worries about the prospect of petrol rationing; two-thirds of western Europe’s oil came through the canal; to ship it round the Cape would cause a vast increase in tanker costs.

Leslie Illingworth, July 30 1956, Daily Mail

Outrage in London and Paris triggered immediate diplomatic and military moves. One July 30 the Admiralty and the War Office announced what they coyly called ‘certain precautionary measures of a military nature’ to strengthen Britain’s position in the eastern Mediterranean.

France, seething at Nasser’s support for the FLN rebels fighting for Algerian independence – and fed a stream of tantalising intelligence by the Israelis – was far more gung-ho from the start, and already supplying arms to Tel Aviv. But John Foster Dulles, the US secretary of state, repeatedly counselled caution – setting the tone for a hardening view from America as events unfolded. With an election in November, President Eisenhower wanted no distractions abroad.

On the British domestic front, at that stage, there was a measure of unity. Hugh Gaitskell, the Labour leader, told the Commons in its first Suez debate on August 2 that he did not object to those “precautionary measures”. But he did recall that Britain was a signatory to the UN Charter and must avoid breaching international law. “We must not, therefore, allow ourselves to get into a position where we might be denounced as aggressors in the Security Council,” he urged. They were prophetic words.

August, September and October were taken up by much high-pressure but ultimately fruitless diplomacy. Britain, France and the US convened a conference of concerned countries to draw up an international administration for the canal. On August 16, when it began at Lancaster House – with Egypt conspicuously absent – the cartoonist Osbert Lancaster came up with a clever if obvious line about being up a creek – or canal – without a paddle. He was right.

Nasser rejected the conference proposal as presented by Sir Robert Menzies, Australia’s prime minister, on September 3. “The situation is very grave,” Menzies reported. The initiative had already been undermined when Eisenhower declared that the US would support only a peaceful solution, helping get Nasser off the hook, “tragedy no. 1”, in the pained words of Selwyn Lloyd, the Tory foreign secretary.

With the political temperature at home rising steadily, the government announced a new plan for a “Suez Canal Users Association” that would require Egyptian cooperation. The arrangements did not look robust. Dulles gave the plan his support, but added that if the Egyptians should resist, no American ship would be allowed to ‘shoot its way through’. That was “tragedy no. 2” for Lloyd. Still, just 10% of the revenues were to go to Egypt – hardly a glittering incentive for Nasser.

Labour was becoming increasingly alarmed by the obvious ambiguities in Eden’s approach. It Egypt refused to go along with the plan, the prime minister warned in the Commons on September 12, it would be in breach of the 1888 Convention governing the use of the waterway. “In that event,” he said, “the British government and others concerned will be free to take such further steps as may be required, either through the United Nations or by other means, for the assertion of their rights.” He would, he pledged, go to the UN “except in an emergency”.

Nasser’s nationalisation, meanwhile, had been implemented, but ships, including British ones, were still getting through the canal on time, and without the help of the experienced foreign pilots employed by the company – debunking the condescending suggestion that the Egyptians could not manage it alone.

In early October diplomacy shifted to the UN. But with Russia leading opposition in the Anglo-French proposals, London and Paris began to hone their military plans – though (and this is crucial to the whole story of Suez) an emerging French idea for a clandestine link with Israel was not public knowledge. It took over 40 years for the whole story to emerge.

On October 16 Eden and Lloyd met Guy Mollett and Christian Pineau, their French counterparts, in Paris. The same day the French navy intercepted a yacht named the Athos, off the coast of Morocco. It was carrying 70 tons of weapons for the FLN and had sailed from Alexandria with the help of Egyptian intelligence. It was the Israelis who tipped off the French – hardening the anti-Nasser mood in Paris.

Unknown to the public in Britain and France – and even to senior diplomats in both countries – it was now that the plot really began to thicken. On October 24 representatives of France, Britain and Israel met in great secrecy at Sevres outside Paris. Ben-Gurion, Pineau and Lloyd were the most senior figures. After three days of talks the parties signed a protocol: in it Israel undertook to attack Egypt, and Britain and France to invade Egypt on the pretext of separating the combatants and protecting the canal from them. That childishly transparent fiction was at the heart of the famous “collusion” that will always be a byword for Suez. The Israelis were to get naval and air support while their forces destroyed Egyptian forces. Eden ordered all copies of the protocol destroyed. The one copy that survived did not resurface unit 1996.

Nasser prepare
Abu, September 2 1956, The Observer

Initial events followed the plan: war began on October 29 with Israeli paratroopers occupying the Mitla Pass in Sinai, 24 miles east of the canal, bypassing the Egyptian defences. An Anglo-French ultimatum followed, threatening intervention if the belligerents did not withdraw from the waterway. The Manchester Guardian called the ultimatum “an act of folly, without any justification in any terms but brief expediency. It pours petrol on a growing fire. There is no knowing what kind of explosion will follow”. The ultimatum was rejected the next day, on cue, by a defiant Nasser. The Israelis, following the Sevres script, complied.

Israeli forces had already occupied Gaza and went on to take most of the peninsula, capturing thousands of prisoners and large quantities of weapons. They called it the “Sinai Campaign”. For Egypt and the Arabs it was, as remains, “the Tripartite Aggression”. French pilots flying Mystere jets with their insignia painted over provided cover for the Israelis. There were suspicions of this at the time but the first confirmation came later from Manchester Guardian correspondent, James Morris, reporting from Cyprus to avoid Israeli censorship

Unease in Britain exploded into open anger. Gaitskell denounced the government for abandoning the principles of British foreign policy. Lloyd was asked directly in parliament whether there had been “collusion” between Britain, France and Israel. “There was no prior agreement between us about it”, he lied.

Keep to the right – and straight on –
David Low, September 12 1956, Manchester Guardian
The ominous and death-like figure of Destiny shows Eden the way

Rock ‘n’ roll
David Low, September 15 1956, Manchester Guardian
Nasser rocks the boat which carried him, Mollett and Eden

Overnight the RAF bombed Egyptian airfields. “The rat that had begun to smell … was now stinking to high heaven” wrote Anthony Nutting, who was about to resign in disgust as foreign office junior minister. The UN passed a US-sponsored resolution called for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of all forces.

It was against this stormy background that the main Anglo-French operation – Operation Musketeer- lumbered into action on November 4. As the cabinet met to approve the final decision, a mass rally was held in Trafalgar Square under the banner “Law not War”. Cries of “Eden must go” could be heard in Downing Street as the crowd marched down Whitehall. The following day, as British and French paratroopers were being dropped and Port Said bombarded, the Manchester Guardian called for the removal of the government. “Sir Anthony’s policy, however sincerely intended, has been hideously miscalculated and utterly immoral,” its editorial said.

Remember, remember
Abu, November 4, 1956, The Observer
Eden is portrayed as Guy Fawkes

A British radio propaganda station, broadcasting from Cyprus, urged the Egyptians to surrender. Resistance was fierce but short-lived. Estimates of Egyptian casualties ranged from 750 to 2,500. The British and French forces suffered 22 and 10 dead respectively. It all provided a perfect distraction for the Soviet Union, which had just invaded Hungary to crush the revolution. Khrushchev threatened a nuclear attack unless London and Paris backed down. The Egyptians sunk ships, bridges and floating cranes to block the canal and Port Said harbour, making a mockery of the whole free navigation exercise.

Eisenhower was livid, protesting he had been “double-crossed”. US officials were ordered to cut off all contact with their British counterparts and raised the prospect of oil sanctions, Most damagingly, the US refused to support a suddenly vulnerable pound. Bankruptcy threatened unless the US Treasury or the IMF provided a short-term loan. Ike said no. Eden agreed to a ceasefire on November 6.

Eden still insisted he had been right to act. "We did what the UN without a police force could not do in time," he said. By mid-November UN peacekeepers were arriving in Egypt. On November 21, suffering from exhaustion, the prime minister flew to Jamaica to recuperate. In early December he agreed to withdraw the troops. France and Israel followed suit. An IMF loan of $560m was approved. On December 20 he followed Lloyd in lying directly and brazenly to the Commons: "There was no foreknowledge that Israel would attack Egypt – there was not." It was the last time he spoke in parliament.

The inevitable came on January 9 1957. Eden resigned. He was replaced by Harold Macmillan. "Sunk off Suez" was the caption under Low’s drawing of a capsized ship in the canal, it’s "go-it-alone" flag just visible above the water, watched by a haggard-looking prime minister

Egypt, under a triumphant Nasser, reopened the canal the following April. It was the end of what has been called "Britain’s moment in the Middle East". It was also, as Nutting put it, borrowing from Kipling, "no end of lesson". And it was one that a later generation was to remember when another British prime minister, working with, not against, the United States, became embroiled in another highly controversial war in the Arab world.

Ian Black, the Guardian
July 2006

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